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THE NEW MANAGERIALISM: COURTS, POSITIVE DUTIES, AND ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
  
KATHARINE G. YOUNG* 
 
Draft manuscript under review for  
Constitutionalism and A Right to Effective Government,  




An inseparable component of liberal constitutionalism is the respect accorded to so-called negative 
rights, which rest on duties of government restraint. But just as governments must have their hands 
tied, in this model, they must also work to secure rights, by actively and effectively planning, 
regulating, budgeting, and monitoring. These positive duties are particularly pronounced for so-
called positive rights, which guarantee access to goods, services and opportunities such as social 
security, education, health care, land, food, water, sanitation, or to a clean environment. Of course, 
it is clear that so-called negative rights require both duties of commission and restraint; just as so-
called positive rights call for the same. Nonetheless, the positive duties that attach to economic 
and social rights put particular pressure on courts, the executive, the legislature and civil society. 
Indeed, courts have become central in enforcing the negative and positive duties that arise from 
justiciable complaints about matters such as medical treatment denials, electricity and water 
shutoffs, evictions, schools and education outcomes, pollution levels, and food distribution 
schemes. The widespread adoption of economic and social rights in a majority of the world’s 
constitutions, combined with a pronounced shortfall in the realization of such rights, herald a new 
managerialism in constitutional government. 
 
This chapter, under review for the edited collection, Constitutionalism and a Right to Effective 
Government, takes one prominent jurisdiction, South Africa, and examines how its courts have 
enforced constitutional rights to access health care, housing, electricity, water and sanitation, 
particularly in the last decade. It describes both interpretive and institutional trends. As a matter of 
interpretation, courts invoke the textual guarantees of effective, co-operative, federal government 
and public administration, alert to the capacity needs of municipalities, alongside express 
economic and social rights. As an institutional matter, courts are increasingly favoring a 
managerial dynamic, co-originating in South Africa’s case with the behaviour of the executive. 
Courts increasingly respond to ineffective government by personalizing responsibility, including 
through costs, joining state actors in private litigation, and supervising and controlling state assets. 
This chapter also shows how conventional alternatives to managerialism, such as dialogic or 
experimental review, have become more responsive to management deficiencies. This includes the 
dialogical suspension of orders, or when courts call on broader institutional actors, and or on 
existing duties on the state to budget and plan. It also occurs during experimental dispute 
resolution, when courts supervise a “meaningful engagement” between the parties, or other 
alternatives. Updating my earlier typology of judicial review, which argued that courts frequently 
                                                 
* Professor, Boston College Law School. Draft, circulated April 2021: contact youngkv@bc.edu with citation 
questions or comments. With thanks to Danie Brand, Yasmin Dawood, Vicki Jackson, and the participants of the 
Workshop on Constitutionalism and Effective Governance, Harvard Law School, May 2-3, 2019. 
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acted as catalysts in provoking governmental or civil society responses, this chapter emphasizes a 




Economic and social rights, positive duties, constitutional law, new managerialism, dialogic 
review, experimentalism, weak-form review, principles of public administration, effective 
government, duty to budget and plan, principles of co-operative government, right to housing, right 




The constitutional entrenchment of economic and social rights often requires courts to intervene 
directly in the administration of government. Such rights – to access goods, services and programs 
such as social security, education, and health care – are now present in over two thirds of the 
world’s constitutions.1 Newer constitutional amendments extend such rights to housing, land, 
water and a clean environment, implicating a wide array of government actions or omissions. 
Moreover, despite the conventional wisdom that such rights should not be enforced by courts, and 
be entrenched at most as directive principles or other statements of aspiration, the duties on 
government that such rights create are increasingly justiciable.2 For better or worse, courts have 
become central in enforcing both negative and positive duties, in complaints arising from such 
matters as medical treatment denials, evictions, education outcomes, pollution levels, or food 
distribution schemes.3   
 
The scholarly response to these trends has largely been focused on two adverse and largely 
opposing consequences: the judicial usurpation of the elected branches, or the judicial abdication 
of the enforcement role. In both versions, the constitutional entrenchment of economic and social 
rights portends further pressure on governments already strained by other political and economic 
trends, such as a rise of anti-establishment, non-institutionally mediated populist politics or of 
pressures for outsourcing or privatization of government duties.4 And yet the judicial practice of 
enforcement, particularly in the Global South, has been far more complex than such criticisms 
assume. From South Africa, India and Colombia (as the most noted examples),5 as well as other 
                                                 
1 Textual counts include Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, Economic and Social Rights in National 
Constitutions 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 1043–1098 (2014).  
2 Evan Rosevear, Ran Hirschl & Courtney Jung, Justiciable and Aspirational Economic and Social Rights in 
National Constitutions, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (Katharine G. Young, ed., 2019). 
3 For a range of such examples, see THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (Katharine G. Young, ed., 
2019). See also ADAM CHILTON & MILA VERSTEEG, HOW CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS MATTER (2020), ch. 7; Daniel 
Brinks et al,. Social Rights Constitutionalism: Negotiating the Tension Between the Universal and the Particular, 11 
ANNUAL REV. OF L. AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 289 (2015). 
4 See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark Tushnet, Sanford Levinson & Mark Graber, eds., 2019). 
While this chapter was written prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, and does not deal with the significant changes 
wrought by, the connection between government failures in this area, and earlier retrenchments of economic and 
social rights, was explicitly drawn in the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights statement: 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Statement on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) 
pandemic and economic, social and cultural rights para. 4 (2020). 
5 E.g., CESAR RODRIGUEZ AND DIANA RODRIGUEZ-FRANCO, RADICAL DEPRIVATION ON TRIAL: THE IMPACT OF 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH (2015). Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
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prominent jurisdictions, close analysis of particular periods and trends in jurisprudence indicate a 
varied repertoire of judicial enforcement, and a similarly assorted range of governmental 
responses. Within this variety, the muted enforcement of housing rights in the Grootboom case of 
South Africa has provided perhaps the most canonical example.6 
 
This chapter magnifies this detail, in demarcating the trends of enforcement in South Africa over 
the last ten years. These trends suggest a heightened managerialism in enforcing positive duties, 
where courts directly manage and supervise the remediation of a rights complaint. Emerging forms 
of managerialism involve an increasing personalization of governmental responsibility, a 
broadening of duty-holders and stakeholders, and a rising urgency in responding to the government 
intransigence, incompetence or inertia that have led to findings of unconstitutionality. In particular, 
the chapter updates a past typology of judicial review of economic and social rights complaints, in 
which a “catalytic” court embraces different forms of review, by accessing postures of 
managerialism, dialogue, deference, supremacy or experiment in order to “catalyze” government 
(and broader public) action.7 That typology, which sought  to unsettle a simple opposition between 
“weak” or “strong” courts in economic and social rights cases,8 confirmed the dynamism between 
those positions. In this analysis, the predicted trend that “weaker” stances become “strong” over 
time is observed, with both courts and other governmental actors – in particular the executive – 
co-creators of the dynamic. Part I of this chapter examines an increasing tendency of the courts to 
interpret rights, apply standards and order remedies through a theory of effective public 
administration. Parts II-IV of the chapter examine the evolving repertoire of managerial, dialogic, 
and experimental review, identifying a more personalized and urgent setting in which courts 
pursue the goals of effective, democratically responsive, government through constitutional rights. 
 
I. POSITIVE DUTIES AND SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
Due in part to its post-apartheid Constitution and the calibre of its first Constitutional Court, South 
African constitutionalism has become an influential model for economic and social rights 
enforcement, although examples from India in the 1980-1990s and Colombia in the early 2000s 
are also familiar entry-points. In South Africa, economic and social rights are entrenched in the 
following textual formulation: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to have access to- 
[health care services, including reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; 
social security … adequate housing … a basic education] 
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. …9 
 
                                                 
Latvia, Nepal, and even the U.S. state constitutions, provide interesting parallels, all beyond the scope of the present 
chapter. See generally THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 2. 
6 Katharine G. Young, The Canons of Social and Economic Rights, in GLOBAL CANONS IN AN AGE OF 
UNCERTAINTY: DEBATING FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Sujit 
Choudhry, Michaela Hailbronner & Mattias Kumm, eds., forthcoming).  
7 KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012). 
8 MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008). 
9 See, e.g., STH. AFR. CONST., ss 26, 27, 29. 
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Section 7 also sets out the government’s duties to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ the rights 
in the Bill of Rights, Section 36 confirms that rights may be limited “only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable”, and Section 39 mandates 
that courts interpreting rights consider international law and permits them to consider foreign law.  
 
These textual guarantees have been interpreted to emphasize government accountability for rights-
realization, rather than individual entitlement.10 For example, the South African Constitutional 
Court has emphasized the government’s duties to “take reasonable measures” to progressively 
realize these guarantees (that is, it has emphasized sub-section 2, above), in place of any self-
standing notion of rights’ essential or ‘core’ content.11 The Court has provided a theory of 
“reasonableness” in government action, injecting a heightened rights-responsiveness to traditional 
administrative law principles.12 It has also been active in promoting remedial discretion, and the 
need to innovate with effective remedies.13 Such remedies include, as is discussed below, reading 
in, reading down, severance of words, the limiting and retrospective effect of the declaration of 
invalidity, or a suspension of the declaration of invalidity, the use of interdicts and the modification 
of the common law.14  
 
A notable recent trend is the Court’s recourse to constitutional text to substantiate the standard of 
reasonableness. For example, the South African Constitutional Court has reiterated the basic 
principles of public administration – Section 195(1) – in successful economic and social rights 
claims. That detailed section requires that, for every sphere of government: 
 
a. A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained. 
b. Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted. 
c. Public administration must be development-oriented. 
d. Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias. 
e. People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate 
in policy-making. 
f. Public administration must be accountable. …  
[and g. transparent and h. actively instructed and i. representative]  
 
This section is included alongside broader objects and duties of government, and rule of law 
principles.15 These overarching governance principles are themselves nonjusticiable. Yet their 
                                                 
10 For analysis, see David Bilchitz, Towards a Defensible Relationship between the Content of Socio-Economic 
Rights and the Separation of Powers; Conflation or Separation? in THE EVOLUTION OF THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS: BETWEEN THE GLOBAL NORTH AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 57 (David Bilchitz & David Landau, eds., 2018). 
11 E.g. Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
12 SANDRA LIEBENBERG, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: ADJUDICATION UNDER A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION 
(Cape Town: Juta Academic, 2010); see also Katharine G. Young, Proportionality, Reasonableness and Economic 
and Social Rights, in PROPORTIONALITY: NEW FRONTIERS, NEW CHALLENGES (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, 
eds., 2017). 
13 E.g., Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security, 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC), para. 18-19, 69 (interpreting the Interim 
Constitution) (“In our context an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy”). See also Sth. Afr. Const., ss 
38 and 172(1)(b), which provides that the Constitutional Court may make any order which is just and equitable. 
14 See summary, Georgina Jephson & Osmond Mngomezulu, Constitutional Litigation Procedure, in PUBLIC 
INTEREST LITIGATION (Jason Brickhill ed., 2018) 135, 149. 
15 E.g., STH. AFR. CONST., s 4 (constitutional principle of co-operative government); s 41 (co-operative government 
among organs of state); s 100 (Justifying national intervention to assume responsibilities when necessary for 
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appearance in the reasoning and orders of recent cases has created, according to local advocate 
Nikki Stein:   
 
a feedback loop, in terms of which the values and principles of good governance can be 
used to realize socio-economic rights, and litigation to advance socio-economic rights can 
be used to build and strengthen the principles set out in s 195.16  
 
This is a very different picture from the formal and static separation of “rights” and “structural 
principles” in broader constitutional analysis. Of course, these developments are not restricted to 
economic and social rights enforcement – the South African Constitutional Court has ordered a 
response to other failures of constitutional duty, such as its order that the parliament had failed its 
constitutional duty to hold the president accountable for corruption proceedings – an act that 
arguably brought an end to Jacob Zuma’s 9 year presidency (2009-2018).17 Courts have been 
frustrated – or perhaps emboldened – by several egregious government lapses, and the economic 
and social rights jurisprudence should be read as part of these broader developments. Moreover, 
these juridical developments must be understood against a complex backdrop of what we might 
call post-liberal constitutional ambition. An increasing concern among constitutional and wider 
commentators has been the gap between a “politics of accountability” and a “politics of 
capability”.18 For this reason, it is worth revisiting the model of catalytic courts that attempted to 
tie accountability to capability.  
 
A 2010 typology suggested that judicial enforcement occupied a range of distinctive positions, 
from managerialism (such as command-and-control style structural injunctions), to dialogue (such 
as suspended declarations), to experimentalism (such as participatory remedies), to more 
supremacist or deferential measures, depending upon the government’s failure of duty.19 For the 
remainder of this chapter, the trends towards new forms of managerialism, dialogue and 
experimentalism in South Africa are explored. 
 
II. MANAGERIALISM – PERSONALIZING OR BROADENING RESPONSIBILITY   
 
Judicial managerialism refers to the courts’ supervision of both the rights’ substantive content and 
the duty required of government when shortfalls are identified. This occurs, for example, when 
                                                 
essential national standards etc.); s 152 (stating the objects of local government and requiring municipalities to strive 
to achieve these objects); s 153(a) (providing that a municipality must “structure and manage its administration and 
budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and 
economic development of the community”; s 154 (national and provincial governments to support municipalities); s 
156 (authorising municipalities to carry out their functions).  
16 Nikki Stein, A Better Life for All: Using Socio-Economic Rights Litigation to Enforce the Principles Governing 
Public Administration 34 STH. AFR. J. OF HUM. RTS. 91, 98-99 (2018). 
17 Heinz Klug, State Capture or Institutional Resilience: Is There a Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in South 
Africa, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet, eds., 
2018) 295, 308 (describing a series of Constitutional Court cases that held the president – and parliament – 
accountable to the Constitution). 
18 On the connection between these and the robust response to social security rights enforcement, see Stuart 
Woolman, A Politics of Accountability: How South Africa’s Judicial Recognition of the Binding Legal Effect of the 
Public Protector’s Recommendations Had a Catalysing Effect that Brought Down a President CONST. CT. REV 155 
(2018). 
19 YOUNG, supra note 7, at 142-66. 
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courts issue structured and/or mandatory forms of relief that require continuing, day-to-day, 
control, and raise the prospect of contempt proceedings against government officials if compliance 
is not achieved. The classic example is the structural injunction, and the U.S. template is, of course, 
Brown II and its progeny, when the court was involved in the management of desegregation 
through school registrations, busing, etc (prison reform is another obvious precursor in the U.S.).20 
In South Africa, lower courts have enthusiastically followed this path.21 An influential model 
prescribes such relief when government actors are “intransigent, incompetent or inattentive”.22 
Orders to address incompetency – or government incapacity or ineffectiveness – sometimes recall 
bankruptcy reorganization.23 Increasingly, courts call on managerialism when previous declaratory 
orders have not been complied with (as predicted by Mark Tushnet and others).24 Below, I 
highlight a new and increasingly complex repertoire of managerial responses, that have arisen in 
complaints in relation to the constitutional rights to social security, education and housing.  
 
Personalizing responsibility: One notable trend is the use of cost orders (often awarded, in South 
Africa, against the losing party), as personal to the responsible government official. For example, 
after a series of cases involving the failure to respect the right to social assistance, the 
Constitutional Court ordered the responsible Minister to pay 20% of the costs of the complainants, 
with the rest apportioned on the department and agency.25 Noting that “it is a novel matter to hold 
a cabinet minister personally responsible for the costs of litigation”,26 the Constitutional Court also 
directed the court’s registrar to forward the judgment and a commissioned report to the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions, to consider whether the Minister had lied under oath and, if so, 
whether she should be prosecuted for perjury.27 Citing section 195 of the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court affirmed the basic values and principles governing public administration and 
the seriousness of the Minister’s lapse, and her use of her position “as Minister of the Department 
                                                 
20 E.g., Brown v. Board of Education 349 U.S. 294 (“Brown II”, ordering schools to integrate “with all deliberate 
speed”). Such actions have been theorized in the US by, amongst others, Abram Chayes, Alexander Bickel, Owen 
Fiss, Judith Resnik, Malcolm Feeley and Ed Rubin.  
21 In the famous Grootboom case, for example, the lower court had ordered the municipal government to promptly 
provide tents, latrines, etc, to repair the government’s failure to protect the rights of housing of children; the 
Constitutional Court, in a now common move, reversed the order and issued a declaration only (see below). 
22 Kent Roach & Geoff Budlender, Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When Is It Appropriate, Just and 
Equitable?, 122 S. AFR. L. J. 325 (2005). 
23 For a useful assessment of some predictable parallels, following Abram Chayes, see William H. Simon, Kathleen 
G. Noonan & Jonathan C. Lipson, Reforming Institutions: The Judicial Function in Bankruptcy and Public Law 
Litigation, 94 IND. L. J. 491, 538 (2019) (endorsing these parallels on the theory that “courts can induce reforms in 
both bankruptcy and [public law litigation] because they are removed from the causes of system failure and the 
political and market pathologies that often prevent extra-judicial reform”.) 
24 TUSHNET, supra note 8. See, e.g., Malcolm Langford, Housing Rights Litigation: Grootboom and Beyond, in 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: SYMBOLS OR SUBSTANCE? at 187 (Malcolm Langford et al., eds.,  
2014). 
25 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development [2018] ZACC 36; 2018 (12) BCLR 1472 (CC) (“Black Sash 
III”). There are parallels with the High Court holding President Zuma personally responsible for legal costs for his 
application to prevent the Public Protector from “finalizing and releasing” her report on state capture; see Klug, 
supra note 17, at 306. After the completion of this chapter, in February 2021, Zuma refused to appear before the 
Commission on State Capture, defying a court order; the issue of contempt is currently before Constitutional Court. 
26 Black Sash III [2018] ZACC 36, at para 16. See also Gauteng Gambling Board and Another v MEC for Economic 
Development, Gauteng Provincial Government (620/2012) [2013] ZASCA 67; 2013 (5) SA 24, at para. 54 (SCA) 
(“It is time for courts to seriously consider holding officials who behave in the high-handed manner described 
above, personally liable for costs incurred. This might have a sobering effect on truant public office bearers”). 
27 Id., at para. 1 (Minister Dlamini). 
 7
to place herself between constitutionally enshrined rights and those entitled to them.” 28 When the 
Court later faced the question of holding the Public Protector to a personal cost order, the majority 
emphasized how the common law tests of bad faith and gross negligence are “infused” by 
constitutional obligations.29 This consideration outweighed any potential threat of personal costs 
to her independence,30 including in her handling of powerful and well-resourced persons or office 
holders, and the majority also allowed the punitive cost order to stand.  
 
Personal joinder and inquiry: The enormity of these lapses in the coordination of social assistance 
had led to other remedial innovations. The government department – and its Minister – had left 
the payment system for social grants in limbo for a period of 5 years, after an earlier declaration 
of the unconstitutionality of the initial contracts. This inaction risked disrupting the payment of 
social grants affecting some 17 million South Africans. Before issuing the personal costs order 
described above, the Constitutional Court ordered the Minister to provide reasons why she should 
not be ordered to pay the cost of the application.31 When her returning affidavit stated facts which 
conflicted from those given by members of the department, the Constitutional Court joined her in 
her personal capacity,32 and appointed a referee to conduct a fact-finding inquiry.33 The results of 
this inquiry, which determined she had sought to mislead the court, were made public. 
 
Control of state assets: Similar frustration has been expressed by lower courts enforcing the right 
to a basic education. In one case, when the relevant education department had not reimbursed 
schools for the payment of teacher’s salaries, despite an order to do so, the court was asked to 
declare the salaries as public debts under state liability legislation. Attorneys then took steps to 
attach state property – the motor vehicles used by the Minister of Education and her Director 
General – to have it sold at sales in execution to realize the moneys owed.34 The salaries were 
immediately paid.35 A corollary can be found in High Court orders directing the auctioning of 
municipal vehicles to settle debt, including debt owed to water service providers.36 At the same 
time, the latter disputes have resulted in court orders preventing water service providers from 
                                                 
28 Id., at para 12 (citing s. 195 and the Public Administration Management Act 11 of 2014 (pending proclamation of 
commencement)). The Court also noted the “The Department of Social Development … is as much responsible for 
the realisation of rights outlined in the Constitution as this Court”). 
29 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank [2019] ZACC 29; 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) \para 154 (refusing to set 
aside order to pay 15% of the South African Reserve Bank’s costs). The High Court had found the Public Protector, 
Ms Busisiwe Mkhwebane, abused her office in issuing reports on the Reserve Bank, which had caused severe harm 
to the South African economy. 
30 Id. Compare with para 6 (Mogoeng CJ dissent, emphasizing the “chilling effect” of personal cost orders). 
31 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development [2017] ZACC 8; 2017 (3) SA 335 (CC) (Black Sash I), para 
76. 
32 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development [2017] ZACC 20; 2017 (9) BCLR 1089 (CC) (Black Sash II) 
para 24. 
33 Order dated 2 August 2017. 
34 Cameron McConnachie &Samantha Brener, Litigating the Right to Basic Education, in PUBLIC INTEREST 
LITIGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (Jason Brickhill, ed.), 281, 299; following Linkside v. Minister of Basic Education 
[2015] ZAECGHC 36. 
35 Id.  
36 Auctioning of Kopanong’s fleet halted, Bloemfontein Courant (February 10, 2021) (noting debts to Bloem Water).  
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restricting their bulk water supply below certain levels, when they had threatened to do so in order 
to enforce payments from financially strapped municipalities (later placed in administration).37  
 
Joinder of state actors: In other litigation involving evictions and the right to adequate housing, 
initial suits which have ostensibly not involved state actors have resulted in their joinder, or other 
orders of information and reports. Where private landowners have sought to evict occupiers from 
private land, the Constitutional Court has requested, in reviewing whether the eviction is just or 
equitable, information from local municipal authorities. Because of the constitutional duty to 
provide temporary accommodation to those threatened with homelessness, which applies to those 
occupying public land, private land, and to those residing in a contractual relationship of tenancy, 
the municipal authority has been deemed implicated and the courts have relied on both s 26 and s 
152.38 Indeed, a rule of practice has developed so that the relevant local authority must be joined 
as a party in any large-scale eviction, in order to provide information about foreseeable disruption, 
and possibilities for providing alternative accommodation.39 
 
Supervision of timing: As well as issuing dates as to when each step must be complied with, in 
classic structural mode, the Constitutional Court has also sequenced each step to avoid a rights 
violation. For example, in another evictions case, the date of eviction was required to be 14 days 
after the City’s obligation to provide accommodation – thus allowing the occupiers “some time 
and space” to be certain of their accommodation and to make arrangements for relocation. The 
private occupier was required to exercise “a degree of patience” in this respect, and (unlike in an 
earlier case involving a longstanding property owner and recent squatters40) no compensation was 
ordered for this time period. In finessing its order, the date of eviction was also delayed: it “should 
not follow too soon after the date of the judgment”,41 according to the Court.  
 
Issuing interim relief: Lower courts have also sought to relax the procedural rules on interim 
injunctions. For example, the North Gauteng High Court sought to prohibit the levying and 
collection of tolls pending further proceedings for final relief as to whether the government 
possessed the power to declare certain roads as toll roads.42 Although later reversed by the 
Constitutional Court, many local commentators had recommended that such an excessive 
intervention was justified according to a reordered conception of the separation of powers,43 and 
the guarantee of economic and social rights.  
                                                 
37 Bloem Water heads to High Court in battle against Mangaung Metro, Bloemfontein Courant (September 20, 
2019). See further infra note 57 (ordered prevention of electricity interruption). With thanks to Danie Brand for 
pointing out this corollary. 
38 Gustav Muller & Sandra Liebenberg, Developing the Law of Joinder in the Context of Evictions of People from 
their Homes, 29 SAJHR 554 (2013). 
39 This rule is now contained in practice directives of the various divisions of the High Court. Since the completion 
of this chapter, the government elected to suspend all evictions during the lockdowns required for suppression of 
Covid-19, Government Gazette, 26 March 2020. 
40 President of the Republic of South Africa v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty.), Ltd., (2005) (5) SA 3 (CC) (ordering 
compensatory damages to the private landowner for the period before eviction could be carried out, with alternative 
land available). 
41 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Blue Moonlight Properties (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZACC 33, 2012 
(2) SA 104 (CC). 
42 National Treasury v. Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance (OUTA) [2012] ZACC 18, 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC).  
43 See Mia Swart and Thomas Coggin, The Road Not Taken: Separation of Powers, Interim Interdicts, Rationality 
Review and E-Tolling in National Treasure v Opposition to Urban Tolling CONST. CT. REV. 346. 
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“Deeming”: The right to education cases also involved complaints about the education 
department’s failure to appoint teachers, despite earlier court orders. The courts then “deemed” 
teachers to have been formally appointed, if they had complied with a statutory and policy 
requirement in terms of qualification and hiring. The posture recalls a more peremptory form of 
review, beyond managerialism.44 Early on, the Constitutional Court had engaged in peremptory 
review when it had “read in” rights-respecting words into otherwise rights-infringing legislation, 
thereby correcting them without further inter-branch involvement. In the remedial context 
involving positive duties, such peremptory review can involve an act of “amending” legislation 
(instead of overturning it) or “reading in” new words to “cure” legislation, rather than severing 
it.45 Here, the deeming provisions were directed against the executive. 
 
Substantive outcome decrees: As well as these structural interventions related to government 
actors, lower courts have, unsurprisingly, also issued a series of substantive outcome decrees. For 
example, the supreme court and lower courts have ordered structural relief in relation to a number 
of discrete requirements for basic education, such as textbooks,46 student chairs and desks,47 
teachers’ salaries,48 and school transport.49 Yet such orders have revealed a basic incapability to 
comply, especially in the province of Limpopo, where litigation exposed “a deep rot in the 
provincial department, which … paralysed them in their attempts to deliver the building blocks of 
basic education … from textbook delivery … dilapidated school infrastructure, shortages of 
teachers, shortages of school furniture and the failure to provide adequate funding for schools’ 
day-to-day needs”.50 In this context, after only scattered compliance, the court was forced to 
reorient its orders to the more basic competencies of public administration, such as data collection 
on schools or textbooks. After repeated failures of structural orders, complainants sought 
declaratory relief, in part in order to maintain their own control over the delivery, rather than rely 
on the court’s schedule, as well as to limit further opportunities, on the part of the department, to 
seek extensions.51 Such declaratory relief can avoid the unintended consequences, and rushed and 
ineffective action, that accompany structural orders, when planning systems are inadequate.52  
 
III. DIALOGUE – INCREASING URGENCY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT  
 
An emphasis on dialogue occurs, not when courts attempt to directly manage the correction of a 
rights-dispute, but rather when they invite an inter-branch response. This is done by a less detailed 
interpretation of the right and a more declaratory remedy. Yet the theorized tropes of dialogue – 
                                                 
44 YOUNG, supra note 7 (noting the features of peremptory review). 
45 Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (making “citizens and permanent residents 
eligible for social security grants).  
46 Minister of Basic Education v. Basic Education for All, 2016 (4) SA 63 (SCA).  
47 Madzodzo v. Minister of Basic Education, 2014 (3) SA 441 (ECM). 
48 Centre for Child Law v. Minister of Basic Education, 2013 (3) SA 183 (ECG). 
49 Tripartite Steering Committee v. Minister of Basic Education, 2015 (5) SA 107 (ECG).  
50 Stein, supra note 16, at 101. 
51 Faranaaz Veriava, The Limpopo textbook litigation: a case study into the possibilities of transformative 
constitutionalism (2016) 32 STH. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 321. 
52 For the acknowledgement of such dangers, see McConnachie and Brener, above. Concerns of polycentricity are 
also raised. For broader analysis, see JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS; Kent Roach, Polycentricity and Queue-
jumping in Public Law Remedies: A Two-Track Response 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 3 (2016). 
 10
declarations of invalidity, suspended orders, pre-legislative parliamentary committees, legislative 
overrides – are complicated in respect of economic and social rights, particularly in relation to 
positive duties. From the early, famous, displays of dialogue in the declaratory orders of 
Grootboom and TAC,53 where the Court found no reason not to trust the government to comply 
with the standard of reasonableness in designing housing or health care policy, the Constitutional 
Court can no longer assume compliance.54 It thus has engaged in forms of dialogue notable for 
their urgency and broader institutional engagement, seeking responses not only from the legislative 
and executive branches, but also from a broader array of governmental and non-governmental 
actors. This stance is demonstrated in a serious of disputes related to housing and social security 
rights, and is indicated by the following: 
 
Suspension of declarations: The suspension of declarations has a long provenance in dialogue 
theory: that is, providing a timed delay before action is required by the order, which allows the 
government to design and deliver its own response to a constitutional infringement. Unlike 
managerialism, this form of review moves closer to the resolution of the representation problems 
of constitutional rights enforcement. In positive provisioning cases, however, the suspension has 
revealed a different justification: a suspension helps to ensure that rights-holders receiving an 
entitlement as part of a positive obligation are not subject to disruption or discontinuity. For 
example, in the social assistance cases described above, the Constitutional Court had to ensure that 
grant payments, although declared unconstitutional, could continue. This required a supervisory 
double-act: first declaring the original disbursement contract null and void, and then suspending 
this order of invalidity for a year in order to ensure the continuing disbursement of grants. Later, 
the original contract was reinstated, in order to ensure the protection of the beneficiaries’ personal 
data and to ensure the transparency and accountability of the payment process.  
 
Broader institutional involvement: The Constitutional Court has also regularly called on other 
organs of state to assist in enforcing positive duties, through monitoring and other responsibilities. 
In this respect, auditors, treasury reporters, human rights commissions, health ombudspersons, and 
even private actors (such as law societies) have been named by the court in “unofficial” orders 
seeking particular action or accountability. Early on, in Grootboom, the Constitutional Court called 
on the South Africa Human Rights Commission to monitor the order.55 But in follow up cases, an 
array of other actors have assisted, often in response to complainant requests.56 In this respect, the 
Constitutional Court refers to the role obligations of each institutional actor – like s 195(1) and the 
duties of public management, or duties on municipal authorities, principles of co-operative 
government and the like. When electricity providers attempted to terminate supply to an entire 
municipality, for example, in order to extract payment from delinquent municipalities, the 
                                                 
53 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom, [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
54 See generally. CONSTITUTIONAL TRIUMPHS, CONSTITUTIONAL DISAPPOINTMENTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF 
THE 1996 SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION'S LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE (Rosalind Dixon & Theunis 
Roux, eds., 2018). 
55 Grootboom, at para 97. 
56 See, e.g., Black Sash I, supra note 31, at paras 37, 71-74 (appointing the Auditor-General to review the interim 
contract, at the request of the Black Sash Trust.)   
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Supreme Court noted the duties of national and provincial governments to intervene, as well as 
those of the electricity provider itself to avert the disastrous consequences.57   
 
Duties to budget and plan: Economic and social rights raise, of course, fiscal concerns, and yet 
the courts have been reluctant to order, by decree, that executive officials with taxing or borrowing 
authority exercise it in any general or specific way.58 Instead, the posture of dialogue assumes that 
such response will be met. Yet even under this approach, the Constitutional Court has increasingly 
called on the functions and powers of local government, including those of budgeting and 
planning. In response to the city’s argument that it was not obliged to go beyond its available 
resources to deal with emergency housing needs, the Court noted that “it is not good enough for 
the City to state that it has not budgeted for something, if it should indeed have planned and 
budgeted for it in the fulfilment of its obligations”.59 It ordered the alternative accommodation and 
the eviction, but also declared that the City’s housing policy was unconstitutional, in so far that it 
had excluded, in its catering for emergency accommodation, persons evicted by private property 
owners.60  
 
Common law development: Common law development resembles a dialogic judicial stance, 
insofar as the legislature is free to override such development in response. In one case, for example, 
the Constitutional Court suggested that the constitutional guarantee of economic and social rights 
might provide a justification to depart from a prohibition against periodic payments in 
compensation in personal injury claims.61 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTALISM – LOCALISM AND MODELS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
 
Managerialism and dialogue highlight different orientations for courts in enforcing positive duties, 
and can be situated along a spectrum of strong-form versus weak-form responses. A third model, 
experimentalist review, seeks to dislodge the inertia of inter-branch relations, and inject a more 
directly democratic response, by requiring the participation and involvement of wider 
“stakeholders” in the interpretation and the discharge of the government’s positive duties. This 
third model sees courts directing the parties to engage together to devise their own iterative 
solutions to ensure the realization of the complained about right. Many of the practical features of 
experimentalism draws on the insights of behavioural law and economics (i.e. nudging rather than 
prescribing) and the economic sociology of institutions (i.e. destabilizing public institutions from 
                                                 
57 Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Resilient Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others; [2020] ZASCA 185; [2021] 1 All SA 668 
(SCA) (court holding that the interruption of electricity services to the entire municipality was inimical to 
constitutional obligations); see also Bloem Water interruptions, supra note 37.  
58 Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 US. 33 (1990) (holding that, as a remedy against school segregation, the court may 
order the defendant school board to increase taxes). 
59 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties, 39 (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZACC 33; 
2012 (2) SA 104(CC) at para 74. 
60 While it is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting that a wider discourse of budgeting with respect to 
constitutional rights has developed: see, e.g., Sandra Liebenberg, Budget Must Take Human Rights into Account, 
City Press (21 March 2021) (noting submission of Michael Sachs, acting chairperson of the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission, detailing the obligations of the government to justify its decision “to reduce expenditure on 
socioeconomic rights-related budgetary items and to lower the tax burden on constitutionally mandated priorities”). 
61 Member of the Executive Council for Health and Social Development, Gauteng v DZ obo WZ, [2017] ZACC 37; 
2018 (1) SA 335 (CC). 
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inertia and coordinating different actors in reflexive, problem-solving mode).62 In South Africa, 
features of experimentalism have evolved in the context of an increasingly contentious politics and 
urban violence, putting pressure on its utility in securing rights to housing, health care and 
education cases.63 This pressure may be observed in the following: 
 
Supervising meaningful engagement: In South Africa, experimentalism is exemplified by the 
remedy of “meaningful engagement”, in which the Court orders that the parties engage with each 
other to reach a solution. In an early evictions case, the order was issued in order to upend the 
adversarial postures of the occupiers and city landlord seeking eviction, in a right to housing 
complaint. Since then, it has been utilized in additional evictions cases, finding appeal in its 
capacity to transform hostile parties into coordinated negotiators, and to stimulate organizing on 
behalf of complaints. More recent complaints involving the right to education have also been 
resolved through the meaningful engagement order, although the capacity to coordinate “engaged” 
parties has been limited when the complainants are unorganized.64 In litigating the availability of 
school textbooks, and other resources, meaningful engagement has again been used, with greater 
organizing on behalf of parents’ groups leading to greater compliance.65 Further calls have been 
made for an “extra-judicial” (non-court centric) application of this model in bringing protest 
groups together in making demands against government.66 
 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR): Finally, alternative dispute resolution, rather than litigation, 
has found renewed emphasis in large scale institutional violations, particularly when a 
constitutional infringement has been conceded.67 In the Life Esidimeni arbitration, the Gauteng 
health department had conceded its liability for violating the rights to health and other rights on 
the part of some 1,300 mental health care users, after it had terminated its contract with providers 
and moved rapidly to deinstitutionalize. In responding to an earlier interdict of the discharge, the 
health department had signed a settlement agreement undertaking to consult meaningfully with 
several mental health NGOs, such as the South African Depression and Anxiety Group and the 
South African Society of Psychiatrists and to develop a reasonable plan for discharge and 
placement. It breached this agreement, as a later report by the health ombud revealed; that report 
recommended ADR, with the aim of providing redress and restoring trust in the leadership of the 
                                                 
62 Influential commentators in the U.S. from each include Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, on the one hand, and 
Roberto Unger, Charles Sabel, William Simon, Michael Dorf, on the other. 
63 Irene de Vos and Dennis Webster, No Place for the Poor: The Governance of Removal in Zulu and SAITF, 
CONST. CT. REV 321 (2018). 
64 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Parimary School v. Essay NO 2011, (8) NBCLR 761 (CC); see BRIAN RAY, 
ENGAGING WITH SOCIAL RIGHTS: PROCEDURE, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S SECOND WAVE 
(2016); see also chapters by Sandra Liebenberg and Roberto Gargarella, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS, supra note 2. 
65 For general commentary on the importance of organized social movements in such claims, see SOCIAL RIGHTS 
JUDGMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE: MAKING IT STICK (Malcolm Langford, Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito 
& Julieta Rossi, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); T Madlingozi, Social Movements and the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: COMPARING THE APEX COURTS OF 
BRAZIL, INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA (OV Vieira, U Baxi & F Viljoen, eds., 2013) 537. 
66 Sameera Mahomedy, Extra-judicial engagement in socio-economic rights realisation: Lessons from 
#FeesMustFall, 36 STH. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS 49-73 (2020). 
67 For an examination of more community-centred and participatory alternatives to litigation, borrowing from a 
focus on organising, conscientizing and mobilising (OCMS) during the apartheid struggle, see Dhaya Pillay, Moving 
Litigation from Dispute Resolution to Conflict Management, Problem Solving and Building Organisation 
(Unpublished thesis, 2020, on file with author). 
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health department.68 Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke was appointed, and later delivered an 
innovative award, spanning constitutional damages, the provision of counselling and support, the 
construction of a monument, and instituting a reporting process to the health ombud of the 




This chapter has examined and updated a previous “catalytic” model of judicial review in enforcing 
the positive duties that arise from economic and social rights complaints, using the South African 
example. A clear trend towards a more personalized managerialism, more insistent dialogue and a 
more contentious experimentalism can be observed, as well as judicial attempts to open up 
complaints to a broader net of governmental actors and stakeholders. One of the strengths of both 
earlier “catalytic” and “weak-form” models was the touted “representation-reinforcing” role of 
judicial review, given that courts had arrogated to themselves neither the final word on rights-
interpretation, nor a peremptory remedial power. In the last decade, however, with further 
examples of governmental dysfunction, “weak-form” review has given way to a stronger, and 
particularly more managerial, function. Some dialogic remedies have become managerial once the 
declaration went unheeded; others went in the reverse direction, when supervisory jurisdiction 
failed and complainants sought greater potential leverage in declaratory orders. In interpreting 
what is “reasonable” in realizing economic and social rights, courts have emphasized the values 
of public administration, with explicit reference to the non-justiciable, structural, principles of s 
195(1). It is notable that these, and not the constitutional values of dignity or equality,69 have 
helped the courts define the duties in recent cases.  
 
This is not to suggest that judicial enforcement will always proceed on these terms. While in the 
case of South Africa, such managerialism has served to counter inept and corrupt government 
action, and various other forms of incompetence, comparative analysis reveals increased deference 
to government and even hostility towards economic and social rights claimants in some places. 
Moreover, it would be a mistake to view managerialism as a solely court-led intervention, as these 
forms of judicial review have developed in interaction with both recalcitrant governments and 
heavily involved non-governmental actors in South Africa. Successful complainants in economic 
and social rights cases are often represented by sophisticated public interest organizations, who 
themselves coordinate with organized social movements and provide vital political pressure for 
compliance, and often draft their own preferred remedies for the court. This, we might conclude, 
has led to a form of governance that is highly reactive to litigation, and dependent on the premise 




                                                 
68 Health Ombud report, see Stein, supra note 16, at 109. Compare with observed retrenchments in court access and 
their implications: Judith Resnik, Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts as Economic and Social Rights, in 
THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 2. 
69 Cf. Dennis Davis, The Scope of the Judicial Role in the Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights: Limits and 
Possibilities viewed from the South African Experience, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (Helena Alviar García et al, eds., 2015). 
